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Abstract
This research analyzes the relationship between a farmers’ participa-
tion in Nicaraguan supermarket supply chains and the market entries and
exit of neighboring farmers. Drawing on insights from the technology
adoption literature on learning and experimentation, we incorporate mea-
sures of neighbors’ experience into a model of a farmer’s decision to join
or quit these markets. We also test for strategic delay by small farmers
and estimate the price that some farmers may pay for experimentation.
Our results suggest both that that neighbors’ exits negatively influence
a farmer’s own decision to join the supply chain and that some farmers
engage in strategic delay. Early adopters bear costs of their neighbors’
“free riding” in the form of higher product rejection rates and lower annual
transactions with supermarkets. Evidence of strategic delay on the part
of farmers suggests a social process rather than a firm-level roll out of new
contracts within a given village.
Keywords: contract farming, supermarkets, market adoption, Latin Amer-
ica, Walmart, Nicaragua, strategic delay
1 Introduction
Theoretical and empirical research into mechanisms of household technology
adoption has increasingly focused on analyzing the role of social learning and
mimicry. Considerable evidence now supports the hypothesis that social pro-
cesses influence farmer experimentation with new agricultural methods and in-
puts. The existence of social adoption pathways for technology adoption has
implications both for models of innovation diﬀusion and for policies to promote
the uptake of welfare-improving technologies in the developing world. How
might similar social dynamics apply to small farmers’ market participation?
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As a determinant of household poverty outcomes, market participation plays
a major role; it can and should be analyzed as a methodological and theoretical
extension of research on technology adoption. Like a new technology, adopting
modern markets is something of a gamble for small farmers, requiring that
they assume new production and marketing risks in exchange for uncertain
remunerative benefit (Narayanan, 2012; Michelson, Reardon, and Perez, 2012).
How and why do small farmers decide to join a supermarket supply chain?
How and why do they decide to drop out? How do they incorporate what they
observe of their neighbors’ experiences into their own decision-making?
Moreover, the dynamics of market participation may have special conse-
quences in circumstances in which there are externalities to farmers’ entrance
and exit. For example, in the case of supermarkets as contractual buyers, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that the likelihood of contractual hold-up by the super-
market rises as the number of village suppliers increases (Wiegel, 2012). Con-
versely, the entrance of new farmers as supply chain participants in a village
might increase farmers’ bargaining power or help them achieve scale economies
in production or transport.
Even so, the social dynamics governing the adoption of a marketing contract
are likely to diﬀer in important ways from factors influencing the adoption of
a new high yielding variety of maize or cotton. First, the externalities on ex-
isting suppliers of a new entrant into a modern value chain may be both more
significant and more immediate than the eﬀects of a farmer’s adoption of a high
yielding crop variety in a context of well-integrated output markets. A second
dimension distinguishing participation in high value markets is the relatively
high observed levels of farmer exit from modern marketing channels (Ruben,
Boselie, and Lu, 2007; Jano and Mainville, 2006; Barrett et al., 2011). While
some technology adoption research has considered the phenomenon of disadop-
tion (Moser and Barrett, 2006; Neill and Lee, 2001; Reardon and Farina, 2000),
estimates of and models for these processes have thus far been only minimal.
In the context of modern markets, we need to understand better the influence
that a farmer’s exit can have upon neighbors in the same market system.
Building on insights from the technology adoption literature linking adop-
tion to social processes, this paper tests for the existence of social dynamics in
farmers’ decisions to participate in new agricultural output markets. The site
of the research is Nicaragua, where smallholders participating in modern supply
markets have verbal agreements with large supermarkets to grow products meet-
ing chain-specific quality standards. We use a unique data set that includes the
year of entry into and exit from the supply chain covering every farmer known
to have had a stable supply relationship with a supermarket in Nicaragua be-
tween January 2000 and December 2008. As in Foster and Rosenzweig (1995),
we define a farmer’s information set geographically; farmers living within the
same village who enter the supply chain are the set of neighbors from which
a farmer can learn. We argue that a farmers’ participation in a supply chain
would be readily noticed by other farmers living in his or her village. Note
that our analysis does not assess the influence of farmers who decide to stay
out of the supply chain entirely; nor do we have information about the social
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connectivity of farmers within a specific village.
We use a simple lifecycle model to explain supermarket supply chain par-
ticipation and exit patterns in Nicaraguan supermarket supply villages. We
hypothesize that farmers acquire information about the profitability of a new
marketing channel relative to the traditional market from their own experience
in the modern market, but also from their neighbors’ accumulating experience
in the supply chain and from their neighbors’ decisions to exit the modern mar-
ket. Our research therefore incorporates the farmer’s own experience, neighbor
experience, and neighbor exit from supermarket supply chains into a empirical
model, to test whether farmers’ observation of these variables influence the de-
cision to participate in subsequent periods, and also to estimate whether some
farmers pay a price for experimentation with the new market opportunity. Be-
cause the neighbor experience variables are critical to the analysis and because
there are several plausible ways a farmer might accumulate information about
his neighbors’ experience, we construct four diﬀerent measures of neighbor sup-
ply chain experience and run separate estimations for each of the four measures.
Our method of including neighbor exit and tenure as possible determinants of
farmer market participation has potential application to a variety of cases in-
volving technology adoption and market participation.
Results from a model estimating the likelihood of participation in supermar-
ket supply chains among Nicaraguan farmers suggest the following: First, neigh-
bors’ exits from the supermarket supply act as significant negative influences
on a farmer’s own decision to participate in the new market; Second, observa-
tion of neighbors’ accumulating experience in the supply chain is a significant
positive determinant of a farmer’s participation; Finally, we find evidence that
farmers free-ride on their neighbors’ experience, reducing their own experimen-
tation to benefit from the information they glean from their neighbors’ entry
and exit. The consequence of this free-riding: if farmers fail to incorporate their
neighbors’ learning externality into their participation decision, we may observe
under-participation in the supply chain (and under provision of information
about the supply chain) relative to a social optimum.
Our evidence suggests that early entrants into the supply chain (who often
enter alone) experience less favorable contractual terms than those who join later
in terms of the likelihood of supermarket payment default, product rejections,
and number of annual transactions. This finding explains farmers’ observed
decision to strategically delay entry. Specifically, we find that the likelihood of
supermarket payment default is inversely related to the number of suppliers in
a village. We also find an inverse U relationship between the likelihood of a
farmer reporting a signed contract with the supermarket buyer and the number
of village farmers also selling to the supermarket. For tomato growers (the
largest product represented in our sample), we find that the share of production
rejected by the buyer decreases as more farmers join the supply chain in the
village and we identify an inverse U relationship between the number of village
suppliers and the number of annual deliveries made by the tomato farmer to
the supermarket.
As with any analysis concerned with establishing evidence of a social pro-
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cess, we must deal with the potential problem of correlated outcomes. In other
words, given that we observe correlations within villages in farmers’ decisions
to enter and exit the supermarket supply chain, we must distinguish between
the existence of a socially mediated process and locally correlated production
or price shocks that might drive entry and exit. Our strategy is to test for the
interdependence of farmers’ entry and exit decisions using farmer-level fixed ef-
fects models with errors clustered at the village level and to use a considerable
amount of rich data on farmers’ prices and production to rule out the possibility
that within-village shocks drive the dynamics we observe.
We provide descriptive evidence related both to heterogeneous patterns of
entry and exit within-villages as well as descriptives on prices and production
which suggest that what we observe is not driven by within-village shocks. More-
over, evidence of strategic delay on the part of farmers suggests that we observe
a social process rather than a firm-level roll out of new contracts within a given
village. Our data include detailed information on credit, prices and production
quantities, allowing us to control for a number of factors that might drive our
results.
Note that it is not possible to distinguish learning from other factors that
could underly the dynamic entry and exit from supply chains that we observe
in the data; thus we must remain agnostic regarding whether what we observe
reflects learning, mimicry, or even social pressures within villages (Maertens
2012). For this reason, our assessment that farmers learn from one anothers’
outcomes must remain speculative. Nonetheless, we find a strong association
between a farmer’s entry into and exit from the supply chain and the entry and
exit of neighbors. To our knowledge, our research is the first to identify such
social dynamics in the analysis of farmers’ contracting decisions.
The policy implications of our findings notably diﬀer from work establishing
social dynamics in technology adoption. Because high yielding crop varieties
such as new hybrids allow all farmers to benefit without concern for market
externalities, the policy question has generally been how to most eﬃciently
promote universal adoption1. Yet the same is not necessarily true for market
participation; the case of modern markets is more ambiguous. How do farmers
incorporate their neighbors’ market outcomes into their own decisions? What
are the optimal village-level adoption dynamics? Can a farmer’s exit or en-
try from a modern market have a net positive externality in the village? Our
results raise questions about the optimal sequence and level of farmer market
participation and exit as yet largely unasked and unanswered in the literature.
2 Contribution to the Literature
Research into the role of social learning and diﬀusion in technology adoption in
the developing world is rooted in analysis of the adoption of high yielding vari-
eties (HYV) and associated productivity-increasing technologies. Accumulating
1Leaving in the background questions of widening inequality attributable to the adoption
of high yielding varieties.
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evidence suggests that social influences indeed play a critical role in the uptake
and spread of new technologies, whether through direct learning from neighbors
or mediated through social pressures. Work by Narayan and Pritchett (1999) in
Tanzania established a strong positive relationship between households’ social
capital and use of modern agricultural inputs such as agrochemicals, fertilizer,
and improved seeds. Subsequently, Isham (2002) found that social aﬃliations
in Tanzania influence farmers’ adoption of fertilizer and Munshi (2004) iden-
tified that wheat growers’ HYV adoption during the Indian Green Revolution
incorporated the experience of neighbors. Foster and Rosenzweig developed an
influential target-input model of HYV adoption (1995) and their results further
established the influence of learning from others and free-riding on neighbors’
adoption in HYV rice and wheat in India. The research into social networks
and technology adoption has grown further nuanced. Maertens (2009) distin-
guishes between social mechanisms, untangling the eﬀects of social pressures
versus social learning in the adoption of Bt cotton in villages in central India.
Significantly less attention has been paid to social processes influencing par-
ticipation in emerging modern output markets. In some research the role of
a market is implicit, inextricable from the technology being adopted. For ex-
ample, Conley and Udry’s (2010) study of adoption of pineapple for export in
Ghana is simultaneously a study of market participation and technology adop-
tion. The authors find strong evidence that farmers learn about optimal input
allocation from their successful neighbors; but the marketing decision itself is
left largely in the analytical background.
A second gap in the literature concerns the need to incorporate disadoption
of technologies and markets into estimates and models of adoption and learning.
Moser and Barrett’s (2006) study of the dynamics of smallholder adoption of
a system of rice intensification (SRI) in Madagascar identifies a strong influ-
ence of learning from neighbors. The authors identify high rates of farmer exit
from the technology: a village-level mean disadoption rate of 40 percent over
seven years of exposure to SRI. They find that learning eﬀects act as a strong
influence on both a farmer’s initial adoption decision and his later decision to
continue or abandon the technology. Neill and Lee (2001) study the adoption
and disadoption dynamics of an initially successful system of maize-bean crop
rotation in Honduras but there is no social component to their estimation.
Market exit is a potentially important source of information about market
adoption and several case studies suggest that disadoption or exit from modern
value chains and markets is widespread. We see a significant amount of churning
around participation in Nicaraguan supermarket supply chains, and researchers
have documented farmer exit from modern output markets in other parts of
the world including South Asia (Ruben, Boselie, and Lu, 2007), Brazil and
Argentina (Reardon and Farina, 2000), and Guatemala (Jano and Mainville,
2006).
Failure to account for exit from either a technology or an output market
implies an assumption that these choices are irreversible. However, the large
number of exits from market participation in Nicaragua and elsewhere, as part
of a dynamic process of adaptation – in other words, when new options were
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being evaluated by small farmer populations – suggests that the problem might
not be entirely a function of diﬀerences in how, and how successfully, that
new technology is deployed. In particular, the superior technology assumption
in target input models built on Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) – that a new
technology is an absorptive state – may not be appropriate. Moreover, possible
pecuniary externalities of new entrants into a market on existing suppliers are
not permitted by standard household technology adoption models, which are
purely partial equilibrium without externalities other than learning.
Finally, because the outcomes of farmers who adopt a technology relatively
early may provide valuable information to neighbors about expected benefits,
there may be an incentive for famers to delay their own experimentation in
order to observe others’ experience. While evidence of strategic delay among
farmers has been identified in a handful of empirical studies (Bandiera and
Rasul, 2005), no research has tested as yet for strategic delay among farmers
considering participation in a new market. While Bandiera and Rasul identify in
a cross section of Mozambican farmers an inverse U-shaped relationship between
the number of a farmer’s family and friends adopting sunflower as a cash crop
and their own adoption decision, we test for evidence strategic delay directly by
testing for a relationship between neighbors’ observed welfare outcomes – their
accumulating productive assets – and a farmer’s decision to join the supply
chain in the next period.
3 Context
Two primary supermarket retail corporations operate in Nicaragua: the domes-
tic chain La Colonia, and Walmart International, which purchased a controlling
share in Dutch AHOLD’s Central American holdings in 2006. By 2009, Walmart
had opened 46 retail stores in Nicaragua and the domestic chain had opened ten
stores. Michelson et al. (2012) describe the sector and the growth in Nicaraguan
supermarket retail since 2000. The majority of farmers with supply relation-
ships with a supermarket during this period were Walmart/AHOLD suppliers.
Farmers sold a range of horticulture crops to supermarkets including: tomatoes,
green peppers, lettuce, cabbage, cucumbers, herbs, and squash.
We study farmer entry and exit as a function of neighbor entry and expe-
rience, taking as given the initial entry of the first farmer in a village into the
supply chain. The reason for this has to do with Walmart’s buying strategy
between 2000 and 2008. Walmart management during this period competed
six buying agents against one another, using competition between regions to
guarantee that weekly supply quantities are met at the lowest prices possible
(Michelson, Reardon, and Perez, 2012). With agents under considerable pres-
sure to meet strict regional quotas, sourcing during the period of this study
(2000-2008) was chaotic. Buying agents habitually over-committed purchase
order quantities with farmers or made up shortfalls at the last minute by estab-
lishing new contracts. Within this system, a farmer in a supply village would
be largely free to determine his own entry into the marketing chain, once the
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buyer was purchasing in his or her village. Our model and estimation therefore
take the locations of the supply chains and farmers as given.
Qualitative work in farmer supply villages and with former supermarket
buying agents suggest that farmers primarily entered the supply chain in the
following manner: a farmer living close to the central road or with a preexisting
relationship with the buyer or a supermarket-aﬃliated NGO (see Michelson
2013) would begin to sell some production to a supermarket buyer. Often the
buyer reported approaching the farmer after having seen from the road that
the farmer was cultivating a crop that the buyer was interested in purchasing
such as tomatoes, cucumbers, or peppers. Proximity to roads proved crucial
for participation; as Walmart extended the geographic reach of its retail outlets
into secondary cities, the company expanded procurement into more remote
regions of the country, keeping transport costs down by using trucks supplying
stores to backhaul agricultural production to the distribution centers located in
central Nicaragua.2 After an initial series of transactions, the supermarket agent
would discuss with the farmer the crops that the supermarket was interested
in purchasing in the next year, and the farmer and buyer would make a verbal
agreement regarding the quantities he or she could expect the buyer to purchase
and range the of prices the supermarket would pay. The farmer would provide
specified quantities of a crop or crops according to an agreed-upon delivery
schedule, cleaned and sorted to meet the supermarket’s quality specifications
and packed in plastic bins for easy transport. Supermarket buying agents agreed
on a price range for the crop over a production season and agreed to pick up the
crop at the farmgate or in the village. This option implicitly served to incentivize
farmers under contract to increase their own production. These agents reported
that once they had secured a relationship with an initial farmer in a village,
other village farmers were free also to sell produce to the supermarket and to
establish their own informal agreements with the buyer. These farmer entry
and exit decisions (including the decision of the initial farmer to exit or stay in)
are the focus of our analysis.
Note that nearly all farmers in the sample live within one kilometer of the
highway. It is not the case therefore, that the decision of a village farmer living
close to the highway to drop out of the supply chain would cut oﬀ his or her
neighbors from accessing the supply chain.
Regarding benefits to participation in the supply chain, the advantage of
suppling the supermarket versus a local market in Nicaragua during this time
manifest in the following ways: (1) the stability of the price the supermarket
oﬀered, and (2) the supermarket assuming responsibility for transport costs and
logistics from the farm gate to the distribution centers. Previous research es-
2Interviews with supermarket produce buying agents operating in Nicaragua between 2000
and 2008 indicated that primary criteria for a farmer to supply fresh produce centered around
access: the buyer needed to be able to reach the farmer (initially by face-to-face communication
and later by cellular phone) to arrange orders and the trucks picking up the produce for weekly
or semi-weekly deliveries needed to easily reach the farm. In fact, we find that the majority of
farmers supplying supermarkets in Nicaragua during this period lived within three kilometers
of the central road network that runs in a Y-shape around lake Managua between Granada
and Chinandega in the West and Granada and Ocotal in the East.
7
tablished (Michelson, Reardon, and Perez, 2012) that mean per unit farmgate
revenues in the Walmart supermarket chain were not significantly higher than
in the traditional market but that the Walmart supply agreement represented a
significant reduction in price risk relative to the traditional market. The major-
ity of the horticulture produced in Nicaragua is rain fed and the volatile price
in the traditional market reflects the highly variable seasonal supplies. With
Walmart guaranteeing a minimum price, farmers invested more in horticulture
and increased their production (similar to the outcomes observed Karlan et al.
(2013) when farmers were provided with production insurance), in some cases
shifting from seasonal rained production to year-round horticulture cultivation
relying on irrigation. The mechanism by which farmers benefit is neither im-
proved price nor increased productivity but an increase in the total units sold.
Michelson (2013) established that the supply relationship increased participant
household farm-related productive assets in a manner consistent with increased
farmer investment in horticulture cultivation. It is important to note that the
supermarket buyers did not provide the farmer with farm credit or inputs during
this period.
While the relationship mitigates some marketing risk for farmers, joining
the supermarket supply chain is associated with a new set of production and
marketing costs and risks. Evidence suggests that production and post-harvest
processing and sorting increase production costs and introduce new production
and marketing risks (Wiegel, 2012). Farmers bear the cost of payment delays
from the supermarket; farmers reported that while traditional market buyers
always paid in cash up front for production, supermarkets pay farmers by cash
or by check with a delay ranging between a few days and a few weeks. Our data
suggests that the likelihood of loss due to supermarket payment default is signif-
icantly higher than the traditional market; the reported annual incidence of su-
permarket payment default is 1.3 percent, nearly double the traditional market
incidence rate at the farmgate and 14 times the payment default rate reported
in regional wholesale markets. Wiegel (2012) documents that the supermarket
imposes chain-specific and market-specific requirements on farmers including
crop varieties and argues that it is diﬃcult for farmers to switch costlessly be-
tween the supermarket and wholesale market. Moreover, because supermarkets
only purchase the high quality share of a farmer’s production (estimates are on
the order of 70-80 percent, see Michelson (2013)), the farmer must assume the
costs of transporting and marketing in the traditional market the share of his
or her production not meeting supermarket quality standards.
We argue that observation of neighbor outcomes influences farmer supply
chain entry and exit within villages. However, the value of the supply agreement
likely varied over time, relative to the traditional market. The value therefore
was likely observed by neighboring farmers with noise. In other words, there is
a true stream of costs and benefits associated with supply chain participation
relative to the traditional market but those costs and benefits fluctuate over time
based on supply and demand dynamics in the traditional market. The presence
of such noise would explain why some farmers initially enter the supply chain
and then decide to exit.
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In the next section we introduce a simple theoretical framework based on a
lifecycle model to make clear how farmers’ outcomes in the supermarket supply
chain aﬀect others’ decisions to enter or exit.
4 Lifecycle model
We use a simple model of lifetime utility maximization to analyze the farmer’s
market participation decision. Building on the insights of the social networks
and technology adoption literature, we expect that farmer i at time t learns
about the profitability of a new marketing channel relative to the traditional
market not only from his or her own experience in the supply chain so far, Sit,
and exit from the supply chain, Zit, but also from their neighbors’ accumulating
experience in the supply chain, S it, and from neighbors’ exit, Z it. We define
a farmer’s neighbors i as all other residents of the same village who supply
supermarkets at some point between time t = 0 and t = T . We assume that
these informational sources enter separately into the farmer’s decision problem
and that the farmer making a decision at the start of time t uses the realized
experience, exit, and asset variables from the previous period, t  1.
Beliefs about the profits from the modern marketing channel, ⇡mt , are in-
creasing in own and neighbors’ experience Sit and S it and decreasing in own
and neighbors’ exit Zit and Z it. Neighbors’ experience and the farmer’s own
experience reflect learning about optimal input levels and investment in the
contract relationship conditional on participation, as in Foster and Rosenzweig
(1995), while neighbors’ exits Z it reflect the probability that the profitability
of the modern market is less than the profitability of the conventional spot mar-
ket, ⇡m < ⇡c, which would have induced others to exit. Ait and Iit represent
farmer assets and irrigation stocks, respectively.
Our model and estimation take supply chain placement as a given. That
is, we do not model the determinants of the situating of supply chains and
sequential selection of farmers. In each period, the farmer chooses whether to
participate in the supply chain or not, bit 2 [0, 1], to maximize his utility u(.):
u(bitE[⇡
m
t (Sit, S it, Zit, Z it, Ait, Iit)] + (1  bit)⇡c) (1)
with @E⇡
m
@Sit
> 0, @E⇡
m
@S it > 0, and
@E⇡m
@Z it < 0. The farmer’s period t uncer-
tainty about the profitability of the modern marketing channel relative to the
traditional channel is a result of uncertainty over, for example, the optimal in-
vestment level in a market with quality assessment, in post-harvest technology,
negotiations, coordination, etc. In comparison, at time t = 0 the distribution
of the traditional market is known as is the relationship of the central moments
of the traditional market distribution to farmer investment. As modeled in
Equation 1, ⇡c is deterministic.
The farmer’s unconditional maximization problem can be written as the
solution to the dynamic programming problem:
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Vt(Sit 1, S it 1, Zit 1, Z it 1, Ait 1, Iit 1) = (2)
maxbsEt
TX
s=t
✓s t(bs⇡ms (Sis 1, S is 1, Zis 1, Z is 1, Ais 1, Iis 1) + (1  bs)⇡c)
where Sit 1 represents the farmer’s own cumulative experience at the time of
the decision, S it 1 the farmer’s neighbors’ cumulative experience, Zit 1 the
farmer’s own exit, Z it 1 neighbors’ cumulative exits, Ait 1 the farmer’s assets,
Iit 1 the farmer’s irrigation, and ✓ 2 [0, 1] the discount factor. Equation 3 can
be rewritten using Bellman’s equation:
Vt(Sit 1, S it 1, Zit 1, Z it 1, Ait 1, Iit 1) = (3)
maxbit(1  bit)⇡c + bitEt⇡mt (Sit 1, S it 1, Zit 1, Z it 1, Ait 1, Iit 1)
+✓EtVt+1(Sit, S it, Zit, Z it, Ait, Iit)
The farmer’s choice of bit in period t both directly aﬀects his utility in period
t through changes in period t profit and also aﬀects the optimal choice of bit+1
in the next period through changes in expected future profitability due to an
increased stock of own experience, Sit.
We can solve for the farmer’s optimal solution to the value function at t = 0.
The first order condition is:
0   ⇡c + Et⇡mt + ✓Et(
@Vt+1
@bit
) (4)
which at time t=0 can be written:
⇡c   Et⇡mt  ✓(V1(1)  V1(0)) (5)
Equation 4 tells us that in period t = 0 the farmer will adopt as long as the
discounted value of the information he gains from participation is at least as
large as the expected diﬀerence in profits between the modern and traditional
market.
A coordination problem results if farmer’s own participation in time t, bit
(assuming that bit is continuous) is increasing in his own assets Ait or irrigation
Iit. If this is the case for all farmers ( @bi@Ai > 0 8i) then an individual’s lifetime
utility will be increasing in neighbors’ participation and asset and irrigation
stocks. If these cross-partials hold, there will be incentive for farmers to delay
participation and free-ride on the accumulating experimentation of neighbors,
i.e. to engage in strategic delay.
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5 Empirical model
We are interested in the likelihood of participation, which depends on farmer
observed and unobserved characteristics as well as village characteristics. Our
simple model suggests that the likelihood of a farmer’s participation is a function
of his supply chain experience and exit and assets and irrigation as well as his
or her neighbors’ experience and exit, assets and irrigation.
bit = F (Sit 1, S it 1, Zit 1, Z it 1, Ait 1, A it 1, Iit 1, I it 1) (6)
If unobserved farmer characteristics are uncorrelated with the set of observed
explanatory variables, they are in the error term. If, however, the unobserved
and the independent variables have some correlation, the omitted variables will
bias the parameter estimates. For example, with regard to market participation,
there may be some correlation between, on one hand, a willingness to take on
additional risk, and on the other, unobserved social connections involving assets
and access to irrigation. We run both an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and a
conditional logit model.
The OLS model is written:
bit =  1Sit 1+ 2S it 1+ 3Z it 1+ 1Ait 1+ 2A it 1+ 3Iit 1+ 4I it 1+↵i+✏it
(7)
Both the OLS and the conditional logit include farmer-level fixed eﬀects (↵i)
but the OLS model allows us to better handle the standard errors, given that we
have data grouped at the village level3The relative magnitudes and significance
of the results are largely consistent across the two models and we report both
sets. Based on the predictions from the lifecycle model in Section we test the
following hypotheses:
1. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is positively influenced by own
experience:
H0 :  1 = 0 vs. HA :  1 > 0
2. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is positively influenced by neigh-
bors’ cumulative participation:
H0 :  2 = 0 vs. HA :  2 > 0
3. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is negatively influenced by
neighbors’ cumulative exits from the supply chain:
H0 :  3 = 0 vs. HA :  3 < 0
4. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is negatively influenced by
neighbors’ mean asset holdings (evidence of strategic delay):
H0 :  2 = 0 vs. HA :  2 < 0
3The estimation of the parameter vector will be biased and inconsistent with heteroskedas-
tic errors in the nonlinear model.
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5. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is positively influenced by his
irrigation:
H0 :  3 = 0 vs. HA :  3 < 0
6. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is negatively influenced by
neighbors’ mean irrigation (evidence of strategic delay):
H0 :  4 = 0 vs. HA :  4 < 0
7. On the margin, observing a neighbors’ exit from the supply chain is a
stronger influence on farmer participation than observing additional neigh-
bors’ participation:
H0 : | 3| = | 2| vs. HA : | 3| > | 2|
6 Data and measures of neighbor experience
Data were gathered in Nicaragua between September 2007 and July 2008 in col-
laboration with the Nitlapan Institute at the Universidad Centro Americana.
Researchers identified 425 supermarket suppliers who comprised the population
of Nicaraguan farmers who regularly supplied horticulture to the two primary
supermarket companies over some period between 2001 and 2008. Complete
household and village-level data was collected for 396 supplier households. Be-
cause our estimations require that the farmer had within-village neighbors who
also supplied the supermarket, we use the subset of farmers who lived in villages
where more than one farmer supplied – 320 farmers in 77 communities. As a
part of a comprehensive household survey, suppliers were asked to recall their
history of participation in the supermarket supply chain, including the years
that they entered and, if they had exited by 2008, the year that they exited.
Note that if we leave the farmers without neighbors in the estimations with zero
values for the neighbor experience variables, our results remain consistent.
Villages are defined administratively. Farmers are grouped by the name of
the village in which they resided at the time of the survey and these groupings
were confirmed by latitude and longitude coordinates taken at households at
the time of the interview. The supplier population in each village is defined as
all suppliers who sold to the supermarket between 2001 and 2008.
The first two rows of Table 1 presents the annual share of total village partic-
ipants supplying the supermarket and the annual share of village participants
that had exited, by year. The mean participant share increases until 2006,
plateaus in 2007, and decreases in 2008. The mean share of exits (as a share
of total village suppliers) is by construction cumulative and therefore increases
steadily over the eight year period. By 2008, the mean exit share is nearly half
of all suppliers who ever joined the supply chain between 2001 and 2008. The
estimations for the determinants of the decision to participate in time t use the
t 1 variables for neighbors’ and own experience and exits, assets, and irrigation.
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6.1 Participation and exit variables
The experience variables are critical to the analysis. An important question
then: how would a farmer accumulate information about the market experiences
of his neighbors. Would he treat each annual observed farmer’s participation
decision as providing equal information to his own decision making process?
Would earlier entrants (and exits) carry more informational weight than later
entrants? Instead, might he consider his neighbors’ average experience tenure
and exits in the village over time?
In this section we present four sets of experience variables and examine
the relationships among them. We construct four sets of neighbor experience
measures as a robustness check for the empirical analysis - we want to be sure
that the results are not dependent on the choice of the measure of neighbor
experience.
6.1.1 Farmers’ own experience and exit
First, as a measure of own experience, bit is equal to one in the year the farmer
enters the supply chain and all subsequent years until exit and zero otherwise.
Note that we also include a farmer’s supplier status at t  1 in the estimations.
At time t0 < T , a farmer’s experience is the sum of all years that he or she has
been in the supply chain divided by the number of years that have elapsed since
the start of supermarket sourcing in our data (2000):
Sit =
1
t0
t0X
t=1
(bit|bit = 1) (8)
Second, as a measure of farmer’s own exit, zit is equal to one in the year of
exit and all subsequent years and zero before and during participation. The zi’s
are summed over t and divided by t0 to yield Zit:
Zit =
1
t0
t0X
t=1
(zit|zit = 1) (9)
6.1.2 Neighbors’ experience and exit
We construct four measures of neighbor supermarket supply chain experience
and exit: (1) measures of neighbors’ average annual experience and exit (2)
measures in which farmers give more informational weight to early entrants and
less to the experience of neighbors who enter the supply chain as time goes
on (3) annual cumulative participation and exit shares (4) average annual ex-
perience weighted by neighbor similarity using a euclidian distance measure.
As discussed, neighbors are defined as the residents of the farmer’s village who,
at some point between 2000 and 2008, sold horticulture to a supermarket buyer.
Measure 1 - Neighbors’ average annual experience
As a measure of neighbors’ experience, we use the sum of all neighbors’ years of
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experience in the supply chain divided by the number of neighbor-observation
years at time t. In eﬀect, this is a measure of the annual average experience of
a farmer’s neighbors. Therefore, if a farmer has one neighbor who participates
in the year 2002 but then quits, the experience measures would be equal to zero
in the 2001, .5 in 2002, .33 in 2003 and declining thereafter. The value of the
measure will range between zero and one. In general, for village j with a size
nj supplier population:
S it =
nX
k 6=i
TX
t=1
(bkt|bkt = 1)
(nj   1) ⇤ t0 (10)
Neighbors’ annual average years of exit in village j are constructed just as
experience. As with the measure of individual exit, neighbors’ exit z it is equal
to one in the year of exit and all subsequent years:
Z it =
nX
k 6=i
TX
t=1
(zkt|zkt = 1)
(nj   1) ⇤ t0 (11)
Measure 2 - Neighbors’ average annual experience - early entrant
weights
This measure is constructed to give more informational weight to early en-
trants and less to the experience of neighbors who enter the supply chain in
later years and, similarly, to the additional years of experience of neighbors who
stay in the channel. So the entrance of a neighbor into the supply chain in 2001
would convey more information than one who entered in 2008. These measures
are not bounded at one. For example, for neighbors’ experience:
S it =
TX
t=1
nX
k 6=i
(bkt|bkt = 1)/t0
(nj   1) (12)
Similarly, for neighbors’ exits:
Z it =
TX
t=1
nX
k 6=i
(zkt|zkt = 1)/t0
(nj   1) (13)
Measure 3 - Cumulative participation and exit shares
These experience variables measure annual neighbors’ cumulative participa-
tion and exit shares in a farmer’s village. In these measures each neighbors’
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entry and exit from the supply chain is counted once, rather than weighted by
the length of his or her relationship with the supermarket or the time since exit.
So a farmer that enters the supply chain and stays for a single year counts gives
an equivalent signal as one who enters and remains in the channel for multiple
years.
S it =
TX
t=1
nX
k 6=i
(bkt|bkt = 1)
(nj   1) ⇤ t0 (14)
Z it =
TX
t=1
nX
k 6=i
(zkt|zkt = 1)
(nj   1) ⇤ t0 (15)
These sums are normalized by the total number of suppliers in the village.
They can be interpreted as measures of the share of the participant farmers in
the village who had joined the supply chain by time t. By 2008, the experi-
ence measure will approach a value of one and the exit measure will approach
the within-village share of total exiting farmers (as a share of total participants).
Measure 4 - Neighbors’ average annual experience weighted by
neighbor similarity
The final set of experience and weights neighbors’ average annual experience
(Measure 1) with weights frac1dk that measure how similar each neighbor is
to the observing farmer. The experiences of other farmers are weighted using
weights constructed using the inverse Euclidian distance based on farmer ob-
servables, so that the behaviors of those most like the farmer are given greater
weight relative to those of neighbors who least resemble the farmer.
S it =
nX
k 6=i
TX
t=1
1
dk
(bkt|bkt = 1)
(nj   1) ⇤ t0 (16)
Z it =
nX
k 6=i
TX
t=1
1
dk
(zkt|zkt = 1)
(nj   1) ⇤ t0 (17)
6.1.3 Relationships among the neighbor experience and exit mea-
sures
Means and standard deviations of the four measures of neighbor experience are
presented in Table 7. Figures 1 and 2 graph the mean values of measures of
neighbors’ experience and exit between 2001 and 2008.
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The experience variables are constructed to permit neighbors’ entry and exit
from the supply chain to enter in a range of ways into the farmer’s own entry
or exit decision. For example, measures constructed from the cumulative share
of farmers that have entered or exited the supply chain give relatively more
informational weight to farmers with short spell length than those that factor
in a farmer’s tenure in the supply chain.
If both a neighbor’s entry and length of supply relationship provide informa-
tion to the farmer then the number of total neighbor farmer-years in the supply
chain will be a better measure of the farmer’s full information set. The measures
that take into account the similarity of the neighbors’ to the observing farmer
introduce additional variation into the measure because each neighbor experi-
ence variable is weighted by a farmer-specific inverse distance. We run separate
models for each of the four sets of experience variables. The correlations among
the variables obviously decrease over time (as the number of participation years
grows). Note that because a farmer must have neighbors in order to have val-
ues for the neighbor experience variables, the analysis drops any villages where
only one farmer supplied the supermarket between 2001 and 2008, leaving 320
suppliers in 77 villages.
Figure 1: Experience variable means, 2001–2008
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the remaining variables used in
the estimation: own experience and exit variables and annual mean productive
asset holdings and irrigation. Productive assets are compiled into an index
using factor analysis4, (Sahn and Stifel, 2000); details regarding computation
4inputs into the index include household holdings of the following assets: cell phone, car,
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Figure 2: Exit variable means, 2001–2008
of the productive asset index are available on request from the author. Mean
values suggest a pattern of asset and irrigation accumulation among participants
between 2001 and 2008. Note that because we report mean values, the mean
of own experience, assets, and irrigation are nearly equivalent to neighbors’
experience, assets, and irrigation.
7 Results
Results from all models suggest a strong significant influence of neighbors’ exit
on farmers’ participation decision (see Tables 2 and 3). Model (1) uses the
measures of neighbors’ experience based on average farmer-years in the supply
chain. In Model (2) we use the average experience and exit variables weighted
with the inverse of the years elapsed since the supermarket started sourcing.
Model (3) uses the cumulative entry and exit shares and Model (4) weights
the annual experience measures by each neighbor’s inverse diﬀerence from the
observing farmer. All models include year dummies and farmer fixed eﬀects. We
also re-run each model as using an OLS specification with farmer fixed eﬀects
and standard errors clustered at the village level. These results are presented
in Table 3.
bicycle, motorcycle, tractor, plows, carts, backpack sprayer, backpack fumigator, chainsaw,
electric generator, light truck, truck, generator batteries, store room or shed, corral for live-
stock, small grain silo, or dam
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Results are largely consistent and so we discuss the OLS specification results,
which are easier to interpret and for which the errors are clustered at the village
level. Neighbors’ exit in time t  1 is a strong negative predictor of the farmer’s
participation in time t in all four models. Likewise mean neighbor assets in
time t   1 are a strong negative predictor of a farmer’s participation in time
t, evidence of strategic delay. Because own exit from the supply chain is so
strongly predictive of the farmer’s time t decision (only a handful of farmers
reenter the supply chain after exiting), we drop it from the model.
A farmer’s own participation in time t  1 is negatively associated with his
or her participation in the following period. This is a reflection of the high exit
rates in the supply chain and may be evidence of the decreasing profitability of
the supply relationship as more farmers in the village and/or region enter the
supply channel. The significance and magnitude of the influence of a neighbors’
experience years does not appear to depend on the construction of the neighbor
experience and exit variables.
We find mixed evidence as to the relative magnitude of the influence of
observing a neighbors’ exit from the supply chain versus observing additional
neighbors’ participation. In Model (2) we reject the hypothesis that the absolute
values are equivalent ( 2(1)=11.06) but in Models (1), (3) and (4) we cannot
reject the hypothesis of equivalence.
Is the eﬀect of viewing a neighbor exit the supply chain stronger for a farmer
who is already selling to a supermarket or for a farmer contemplating entry? Our
results indicate that a farmer takes more seriously a neighbors’ exit if the farmer
is already himself in the channel. Models with interactions included (Tables 4
and 5) allow us to compare the relative influence of neighbors’ participation and
exit depending on whether the deciding farmer is in or out of the supply chain.
We find evidence that the negative eﬀect of neighbor exit on the participation
of farmers in the supply chain is largely on farmers who have already entered
the supply chain rather than on those waiting to enter. A farmer in the supply
channel is significantly less likely, relative to a farmer who is not in the channel,
to participate in the supply chain in the next year if he witnesses an increase
in the proportion of neighbors who have exited. The coeﬃcients are large and
highly significant.
The year dummy variables are positive and significant, increasing in magni-
tude over time, reflecting the aggregate growth in the number of total suppliers
employed by the supermarket over the sample period.
In all models, the coeﬃcient on neighbors’ mean assets is large and signif-
icant, suggesting that farmers in supply villages may be strategically delaying
their entry into the supply chain. Evidence that farmer’s own participation in
t is significantly negatively influenced by his neighbors’ mean asset levels is fur-
ther evidence that the eﬀect we measure is a social process rather than a firm
strategy of contract dissemination.
To identify strategic delay, however, we must distinguish farmers delaying en-
try from supermarkets’ selecting farmers for contract oﬀers based on observables,
in particular on asset stocks. Supermarkets’ selecting farmers for participation
based on observables would generate spuriously correlated farmer behavior that
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could be misinterpreted as social processes. With respect to supermarket selec-
tion on observables, previous research by Michelson (2013) established super-
markets in Nicaragua did not select farmers based on productive assets or exist-
ing irrigation5, suggesting that the firms were not targeting wealthier farmers
first, delaying or withholding contracts to their poor neighbors. Instead, critical
household characteristics predicting entry into supermarket supply chains were
related to geography, proximity to the central road network, and access to water:
altitude and year-round water for agriculture. These geographic characteristics
are relatively homogeneous within villages in the sample. There is therefore no
clear explanation of a significant negative relationship between farmer market
participation and neighbor assets if the participation dynamics we document
are exclusively firm-mediated.
7.1 Correlated outcomes
A central challenge in this and similar work is whether we can distinguish be-
tween farmers’ correlated outcomes and the presence of a social process mediat-
ing supply chain entry and exit. In particular, we must deal with the potential
problem of spatially or temporally correlated shocks. For example, farmers in
a village might all exit the supermarket supply chain at the same time after
incurring a local price or production shock. Moreover, we must distinguish be-
tween the supermarket oﬀering farmers in a village a coordinated set of oﬀers
and the participation decision being mediated through social learning, mimicry
or diﬀusion. The presence of such within-village shocks could drive empirical
results that we attribute to farmer learning.
In this subsection we assess whether within-village shocks might be driving
our results into two ways. First, do we see evidence of the existence of production
or price shocks in supply villages? Second, is there evidence that changes in
production or in price are related to farmer exit from the supply chain within
supply villages? We have two types of data available to assess whether farmers
are entering and exiting the supply chain in response to within-village shocks:
detailed information about the prices and production of farmers while they
sold to supermarkets and data on the patterns of farmer exit and entry within
villages.
We test for the presence of correlated price and shocks in two ways. First,
we diﬀerence the price and production data for each farmer to generate mean
annual percent change in price and production. We then use an OLS model
with farmer fixed eﬀects and year dummies to assess whether a farmer’s annual
percent change in total production or change in mean annual price received
from the supermarket is related to the average percent change among his or her
supermarket supplying neighbors. We run two specifications for each depen-
dent variable (production, price), including in a second specification a dummy
variable equal to one if neighbors’ mean annual change was equal to zero. Re-
sults from the four regressions are presented in Table 8. We find no relationship
5though supplier farmers were found to have a slightly higher starting asset stock than
non-suppliers.
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between a farmer’s own annual price and production fluctuations and his neigh-
bors’ annual fluctuations. The magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are small, ranging
between -0.01 percent and -0.13 percent and they are imprecisely estimated,
suggesting that one’s neighbors’ price and production outcomes have little ex-
planatory power when it comes to a farmer’s own annual outcomes.
We also compute the intraclass correlation coeﬃcients within villages for
farmers’ annual production. Table 9 presents these coeﬃcients by year for pro-
duction quantity changes. The correlations are low, all less than 0.20 and in
three of the six years, indistinguishable from zero.
We do not find evidence that annual changes in price and production are
correlated in villages in ways that suggest the presence of significant within-
village shocks. A second question, in their entry into and exit from supply
chains do farmers behave in ways that would suggest that their behavior is
driven by correlated within-village shocks?
If within-village shocks drive farmer entry into and exit from the supply
chain, we would expect to see groups of village farmers moving in and out of
the supply chain and, more macroscopically, a pattern of entire villages moving
in and out of the supermarket supply chains. However, descriptives on farmer
exit and entry and village exit do not support this hypothesis. Instead, we see
that villages continued to be “supermarket supply villages” over time but with
farmers within the village moving in and out of the supply chain from year to
year. Farmers generally entered and exited supermarket supply chains alone
or in pairs. For example, in 51 of the 77 supply villages a lone farmer entered
the supply chain in the first year. And in 55 of the 77 supply villages, in the
first year in which a farmer exited the supply chain he or she was the sole exit,
not a group of farmers. In fact, we see considerable variation in the number
of suppliers per supply village, ranging between one and 16. Table 10 presents
statistics on supply village and supplier numbers over time. The point is that
we do not observe the mass entry and exit of groups of farmers, by village, that
would suggest that our results are driven by spatially correlated shocks.
While the set of villages that supply supermarkets remains largely stable
(that is, once a village enters the supply chain, it is likely to stay in the supply
chain), we see considerable churning in which farmers within a village operate
as suppliers from year to year. The number of villages with supplying farmers
increased from nine in 2001 to 60 in 2008.6 And note that our data are not
consistent with the story of mass, correlated exit from the supply chain within
a given village; in 22 of the 77 supply villages, new farmers continued to enter
the supply chain after an initial farmer exit.
While descriptives on farmer exit and entry dynamics do not support the
hypothesis of temporal or spatially correlated shocks driving dynamics, we also
test whether annual farmer changes in price and production are related to the
number of farmers exiting annually from the supply chain. We run both a
contemporaneous model (in which the number of exiting farmers and the annual
6Only seventeen villages drop out of the supply chain entirely between 2000 and 2008. The
majority of these villages had only one or two suppliers at any given time between 2000 and
2008.
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price and production change are for the same year) and a lagged model (in which
the annual price and production changes are lagged one year), regressing the
number of exiting farmers on price and production changes and a vector of
annual dummy variables. The estimated relationships are extremely small and
not statistically significant. In short, we find no evidence that the spatially
or temporally correlated shocks that we can see are driving the entry and exit
dynamics that we observe.
Finally, regarding the firm, we argue that there are few coordinated supply
oﬀers within villages in our data. The assumption that there are few coordinated
contractual oﬀers within villages by supermarkets is reasonable and appropri-
ate in the case of Nicaragua during this period, where there has been minimal
systematic management in establishing the network of farmer suppliers by su-
permarkets. We observe the full set of participants in the villages between the
years 2000 and 2008. We argue that farmers were free to enter or exit the sup-
ply chain at any time, conditional on the annual expansion of the supermarket
supply chain supplier network - and strong growth trends in both the number
of supermarket retail outlets and the annual number of farmer suppliers suggest
annual expansion over this period was steady and significant. Our estimations
show that farmers entry and exit was influenced by neighbors’ experiences and
neighbors’ assets. We argue therefore that our results describe social processes
rather than a coordinated roll-out of contracting oﬀers by the supermarket.
7.2 Costs of strategic delay
Given that we find evidence of strategic delay, we test for possible eﬀects of
delayed entry on contractual terms with the supermarket. Our question: does
it matter if some farmers free-ride on the experiences of their neighbors? Do
farmers that delay miss out on higher initial prices or better relationships with
the supermarket buyer? Do contractual attributes improve as the number of
farmers participating locally increases so that early adopters in fact bear costs
associated with their experimentation?
We have rich data on farmers experiences with supermarkets in every year
in which they sold: average price received (by product) and share of production
rejected by the buyer, whether the farmer had a written contract with the buyer
in a given year, how many times the buyer defaulted on payment in a given year,
the number of annual transactions the farmer had with the supermarket. Our
strategy: we test how these transactional attributes reported by the farmer
are related to the number of sellers in the village in the same year. Table 11
presents descriptive statistics on the contractual attributes we observe. Because
prices, number of deliveries, and quality standards (and therefore rejections)
vary considerably by the horticulture product grown, we restrict our sample to
the largest subgroup - tomato growers (n=97). Table 11 demonstrates variation
across years in the reported incidence of contractual features such as contracts
and mean price, rejections by the supermarket, and annual deliveries. We also
see interesting intra-village variation in these measures, suggesting that within
the same village within the same year farmers may report diﬀerent experiences
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with the supply chain.
We test for a relationship between the attributes in Table 11 and the number
of suppliers in the village by running a series of fixed eﬀects models regressing
the number of annual village suppliers in time t on contractual attributes in
time t. We include a time trend and control for mean neighbors’ productive
assets and farmers’ own productive asset stock.
Table 6 presents results from fixed eﬀects models fun on the tomato grower
sample of suppliers. We find evidence that contractual terms improve with the
number of contracting farmers in a village, even controlling for farmer wealth,
a time trend, and time-invariant farmer-level characteristics (such as working
with an NGO). Evidence that contractual terms improve with the number of
contracting farmers suggests that early entrants into the supply chain may in
fact bear some cost for experimentation relative to village members who enter
later on. These costs are incurred in the form of fewer annual transactions with
the supermarket, higher project rejection rates and rates of contractual default,
and a decreased likelihood of having a signed contract with the supermarket.
Specifically, we find that the likelihood of supermarket payment default is
inversely related to the number of suppliers in a village. We also find an inverse
U relationship between the likelihood of a farmer reporting a signed contract
with the supermarket buyer and the number of village farmers also selling to
the supermarket. For tomato growers (the largest product represented in our
sample), we find that the share of production rejected by the buyer decreases as
more farmers join the supply chain in the village and we identify an inverse U
relationship between the number of village suppliers and the number of annual
deliveries made by the farmer to the supermarket.
The explanatory power of the models in Table 6 are generally quite low,
though with reasonable significance on the coeﬃcients capturing the eﬀect of the
number of suppliers in the village. The evidence should be taken as suggestive
and further research into the benefits and costs of delayed entry into supply
chains is clearly warranted.
8 Discussion
Because the analysis is based only on the sample of farmers who joined the mar-
keting channel between 2001 and 2008 but excludes those who do not change
their participation status over this period (primarily those who never join as
there are very few farmers who supply continuously between 2001 and 2008),
the coeﬃcients are relevant to a model of the likelihood of participation among
farmers who have joined the supply chain. The sample excludes (and we do
not observe) farmers who are dissuaded by their observations of neighbors’ par-
ticipation, outcomes, and exits, from ever joining. Because we do not observe
farmers who saw the exits and experiences of neighbors in the village and never
entered the supply chain, the total negative eﬀect from learning neighbors’ exit
in the village may be larger than estimated here.
With respect to high rates of farmer exit from supermarket supply chains,
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Figure 3: Graphs depict the estimated relationship between the number of
tomato suppliers in the village and the likelihood of a written contract with
the supermarket buyer (top panel) and the number of annual transactions with
the supermarket (bottom panel).
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if producers leave these supermarket-driven opportunities not because they are
graduating to newer, preferred markets but because they cannot perform or keep
up with changing quality or transaction requirements or because procurement
from their region is phased out by the buyer, then a primary set of empiri-
cal questions surrounding disadoption will concern once-participant producer
welfare eﬀects. For example, is adoption of the marketing and production tech-
niques reversible; how specialized to the particular procurement channel are the
investments producers make in time, relationships and equipment; under what
circumstances might exit from the supply chain act as a negative economic shock
to the household?
Finally, our analysis cannot explain initial farmer entry into the supply chain
and further study characterizing the participation of the first-adopter and the
sequence of adoption would be valuable. A related issue for future study is
whether farmers with limited village social connections might be excluded from
information networks that would inform them about the profitability of a new
marketing opportunity.
9 Conclusions
This research investigates the existence of social influences on farmers’ partici-
pation in modern markets. We use a panel of 320 farmers over seven years to
control for farmer fixed eﬀects in a model of market entry and exit. Consistent
with the recent literature on social processes in technology adoption, our results
support the hypotheses that social processes mediate farmers market participa-
tion. Specifically, we find a relationship between a farmer’s decision to enter
and exit a supermarket supply chain and his or her neighbors’ experience in
and exit from a new marketing channel. The influence of neighbors’ experiences
is not limited to the farmer’s initial entry decision but continues to inform a
farmer once he or she has entered the supply channel. In other words, their
subsequent decision whether to continue with the marketing channel once they
have already entered is strongly related to the decisions of their neighbors to
exit or continue. It may be that a farmer is persuaded by his or her neighbors’
exit that the supermarket supply channel is not as remunerative as expected; or
they may find in the subsequent period that there any scale economies in pro-
duction or post-harvest processing that can no longer be realized with a smaller
number of village suppliers. Though it might seem plausible that the exit of
neighbors could actually increase the likelihood of participation, incentivizing a
participant to boost his or her own production to take up the perceived slack,
our our evidence provides no support for this hypothesis.
We find evidence of strategic delay on the part of farmers, evidence that
farmers are waiting to enter until they observe the outcomes of their neigh-
bors. We also find evidence that early entrants incur costs associated with their
neighbors’ delay; that contractual terms improve with the number of farmers in
a village, even controlling for farmer wealth, a time trend, and time-invariant
farmer-level characteristics (such as working with an NGO). This suggests that
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early entrants into the supply chain may in fact bear some cost for experimen-
tation relative to village members who enter later on. These costs are incurred
in the form of fewer annual transactions with the supermarket, higher project
rejection rates and rates of contractual default, and a decreased likelihood of
having a signed contract with the supermarket.
While data limitations require that we remain agnostic regarding whether
the social phenomenon we document constitutes actual social learning or merely
mimicry, our results provide clear evidence that farmers’ participation in modern
markets is influenced through social processes. An implication both of the pres-
ence of strategic delay and of non-contracting farmers (who we do not observe)
staying out of the modern channel based on the observed experiences of their
neighbors is that, if there is a net cost to entry and exit, some farmers may pay
a price for early experimentation. In the extreme, we may see non-participation
in supply chains in villages where the opportunity might have good remunera-
tive potential. The welfare eﬀects of delayed entry are ambiguous. To estimate
the overall eﬀects of farmer learning within and across villages it is necessary
to compare the costs’ associated with farmers’ delayed entry into the supply
chain with the advantages of better understanding the costs, requirements, and
potential benefits of participation through observation.
The relevance of market participation research to broader questions of de-
velopment economics and policy hinges on better understanding the specific
pathways and dynamics through which market relationships aﬀect participant
welfare. How do farmers choose among market opportunities, given that market
selection implies a varying set of investments and transaction requirements, and
what are the consequences of their choices for household welfare? Answering
these questions is important to understanding how some agricultural producers
are able to make the transition out of poverty in the context of new dynamic
markets.
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Table 2: Annual means of experience measures. Standard deviations in paren-
theses.
Neighbor experience 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
measures
Average annual exp 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.34
(0.15) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19)
Average annual exp 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.49 0.56
with early entrant weights (0.15) (0.23) (0.28) (0.32 ) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) (0.38)
Cumulative entry 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.31 0.51 0.75 0.89 0.92
shares (0.15) (0.21) (0.25) (0.29) (0.32 ) (0.28 ) (0.24 ) (0.22)
Average total years 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.13
inv diﬀerence wts (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
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Table 7: Relationship between farmers’ own annual price and production
changes and neighbors’ mean annual price and production changes, OLS re-
gression with farmer-level fixed eﬀects and year dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
production price production price
pct change pct change pct change pct change
Neighbors’ annual change -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 -0.10
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
No annual change (1=Y) 15.47 -0.91
(13.86) (4.82)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
n 419 425 419 425
Table 8: Within-village intraclass correlation coeﬃcients, annual change in
farmer production.
year production
intraclass correlation coef.
2003 0.00
2004 0.00
2005 0.17
2006 0.15
2007 0.00
2008 0.20
Table 9: Supply chain descriptives by year: number of supply villages, number
of suppliers per village. In Model (1) the variables are from the same period
and in Model (2) the annual percent change variables are lagged one period.
(1) (2)
Annual production change 0.00002 -0.00002
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Annual price change -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0006)
Year dummies Y Y
n 433 361
Table 10: Contractual attributes, descriptive statistics
Share reporting 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Written contract 0.38 0.14 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.38
Payment default 0.33 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04
Tomato growers (n=97)
Mean annual price (real cordobas/lb) 3.44 2.96 1.85 1.91 1.85 1.96 1.56 1.26
Mean share rejected, per transaction 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10
Mean annual deliveries 42.00 37.44 32.16 31.66 31.18 27.41 26.96 35.53
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